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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a general time-inconsistent optimal control problem for a non homogeneous
linear system, in which its state evolves according to a stochastic differential equation with deterministic
coefficients, when the noise is driven by a Brownian motion and an independent Poisson point process.
The running and the terminal costs in the objective functional, are explicitly dependent on some general
discounting coefficients which cover the non-exponential and the hyperbolic discounting situations. Fur-
thermore, the presence of some quadratic terms of the conditional expectation of the state process as well
as a state-dependent term in the objective functional makes the problem time-inconsistent. Open-loop
Nash equilibrium controls are constructed instead of optimal controls, by using a version of the stochas-
tic maximum principle approach. This approach involves a stochastic system that consists of a flow of
forward-backward stochastic differential equations and an equilibrium condition. As an application, we
study some concrete examples.
Keys words: Stochastic maximum principle, Time inconsistency, Linear quadratic control problem,
Equilibrium control, Variational inequality.
MSC 2010 subject classifications, 93E20, 60H30, 93E99, 60H10.
1 Introduction
Time-inconsistent stochastic control problems have received remarkable attention in the recent years. The
risk aversion attitude of a mean-variance investor [2], [3] and [9], such as the portfolio optimization with
non-exponential discount function [6] and [7], provide two well-known examples of time-inconsistency in
mathematical finance. Motivated by these practical examples, this paper studies optimality conditions for
time-inconsistent linear quadratic stochastic control problem, where the state is described by a n-dimensional
non homogeneous controlled SDE with jump processes, defined on a complete filtered probability space
(Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ,P)
dX (s) = {A (s)X (s) +B (s)u (s) + b (s)} ds+
d∑
j=1
{Cj (s)X (s) +Dj (s)u (s) + σj (s)} dW j (s)
+
∫
Z
{E (s, z)X (s−) + F (s, z)u (s) + c (s, z)} N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [0, T ] ,
X (0) = x0 (∈ Rn) .
(1.1)
The coefficients A (.) , B (.) , b (.) , Cj (.) , Dj (.) , σj (.) , E (., .) , F (., .) and c (., .) are deterministic matrix-
valued functions of suitable sizes. As time evolves, it is natural to consider the linear controlled stochastic
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differential equation starting from the situation (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2 (Ω,Ft,P;Rn)
dX (s) = {A (s)X (s) +B (s)u (s) + b (s)} ds+
d∑
j=1
{Cj (s)X (s) +Dj (t) u (s) + σj (s)} dW j (s)
+
∫
Z
{E (s, z)X (s−) + F (s, z)u (s) + c (s, z)} N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
X (t) = ξ.
(1.2)
Under some conditions, for any initial situation (t, ξ) and any admissible control u (.) the state equation
is uniquely solvable, we denote by X (.) = Xt,ξ (.;u (.)) its solution, for s ∈ [t, T ] . Different controls u (.)
will lead to different solutions X (.) . To measure the performance of u (.) , we introduce the following cost
functional
J (t, ξ, u (.))
= Et
[∫ T
t
1
2
(
〈Q (t, s)X (s) , X (s)〉+
〈
Q¯ (t, s)Et [X (s)] ,Et [X (s)]
〉
+ 〈R (t, s)u (s) , u (s)〉
)
ds
+ 〈µ1 (t) ξ + µ2 (t) , X (T )〉
+
1
2
(
〈G (t)X (T ) , X (T )〉+
〈
G¯ (t)Et [X (T )] ,Et [X (T )]
〉)]
.
(1.3)
The coefficients Q (., .) , Q¯ (., .) , R (., .) , G (.) , G¯ (.) , µ1 (.) and µ2 (.) are deterministic matrix-valued func-
tions of suitable sizes, which explicitly depend on the initial time t in some general way. Our objective in this
paper, is to investigate a general discounting linear quadratic optimal control problem for jump diffusions,
which is time-inconsistent in the sense that, it does not satisfy the Bellman optimality principle, since a re-
striction of an optimal control for a specific initial pair on a later time interval might not be optimal for that
corresponding initial pair. The novelty of this work lies in the fact that, our calculations are not limited to
the exponential discounting framework, the time-inconsistency of the LQ optimal controls that we are going
to consider, is due to the presence of some general discounting coefficients, involving the so-called hyperbolic
discounting situations. In addition, the presence of some quadratic terms of the expected controlled state
process, in either the running cost or the terminal cost, make the problem time-inconsistent, this can be
motivated by the reward term in the mean-variance portfolio choice model. The term µ1 (t) ξ + µ2 (t) stems
from a state-dependent utility function in economics [9]. Each of these terms introduces time-inconsistency
of the underlying model, in somewhat different ways.
The main difficulty when facing a time-inconsistent optimal control problem is that, we cannot use the
dynamic programming and the standard HJB techniques, in general. However, the main approach to handle
the time-inconsistent optimal control problems, is by viewing them within a game theoretic framework.
Nash equilibriums are therefore considered instead of optimal solutions, see e.g. [2], [4], [5], [6], [7], [9],
[10], [14], [15], [16], [19], [20] and [21]. The fundamental idea is that the control action that the controller
makes at every instant of time, is considered as a game against all the control actions that the future
incarnations of the controller are going to make. Strotz [19], was the first who used this game perspective
to handle the dynamic time-inconsistent decision problem on the deterministic Ramsay problem [16]. Then
by capturing the idea of non-commitment, by letting the commitment period being infinitesimally small, he
characterized a Nash equilibrium strategy. Further work which extend [16], are [10], [16], [15] and [8]. Ekland
and Lazrak [6] and Ekland and Pirvu [7] apply this game perspective to investigate the optimal investment-
consumption problem under general discount functions, in both, deterministic and stochastic framework.
Then, by means of the so-called ”local spike variation” they provide a formal definition of feedback Nash
equilibrium controls in continuous time. The work [2] extends the idea to the stochastic framework where the
controlled process is Markovian. In addition, an extended HJB equation is derived, along with a verification
argument that characterizes a Markov subgame perfect Nash equilibium. In [19], Yong studied a time-
inconsistent deterministic linear quadratic model, and he derive a closed-loop equilibrium strategie, via a
forward ordinary differential equation coupled with a backward Riccati–Volterra integral equation. Hu et al
[9] studied a time-inconsistent stochastic linear–quadratic control model, which is originated from the mean-
variance portfolio selection problem with state-dependent risk aversion, and by means of variational method
they derive a general sufficient condition for equilibria, through a new class of forward-backward stochastic
differential equation (FBSDE in short) along with some equilibrium conditions. In [21] Yong investigate a
time-inconsistent stochastic problem for stochastic differential equation. By introducing a family of N-person
non-cooperative differential games he characterize a closed-loop equilibrium strategie.
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The purpose of this paper is to characterize Nash equilibrium controls for a general time-inconsistent
stochastic linear quadratic optimal control problem. The objective functional includes the cases of hyper-
bolic discounting, as well as, the continuous-time Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio selection problem,
with state-dependent risk aversion. We accentuate that, our model covers some class of time-inconsistent
stochastic LQ optimal control problem studied by [9], and some relevant cases appeared in [20]. Note that,
in [9] the weighting matrices do not depend on current time t and in [20] the terminal cost do not depend on
current state ξ. Moreover, we have defined the equilibrium controls in open-loop sense (in a manner similar
to [9]), which is different from the feedback form (see [2], [3], [4], [6], [7], [19], [21] and [18]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and formulate the
objective. In Section 3 we present the first main result of this work (Theorem 3.2), which characterizes the
equilibrium control via a stochastic system, which involves a flow of forward-backward stochastic differential
equation with jumps (FBSDEJ in short), along with some equilibrium conditions. In Section 4, by decoupling
the flow of the FBSDEJ, we investigate a feedback representation of the equilibrium control, via some class
of ordinary differential equations, which do not have a symmetry structure. Section 5 is devoted to some
applications, we solve a continuous time mean–variance portfolio selection model and some one-dimensional
general discounting LQ problems. The paper ends with Appendix containing some proofs.
2 Problem setting
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ,P) be a filtered probability space such that F0 contains all P-null sets, FT = F for
an arbitrarily fixed finite time horizon T > 0, and (Ft)t∈[0,T ] satisfies the usual conditions. We assume
that (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is generated by a d-dimensional standard Browian motion (W (t))t∈[0,T ] and an independent
Poisson measure N on [0, T ]× Z where Z ⊂ R− {0}. We assume that the compensator of N has the form
µ (dt, dz) = θ (dz) dt for some positive and σ−finite Levy measure on Z, endowed with it’s Borel σ−field
B (Z). We suppose that
∫
Z
1∧|z|2 θ (dz) <∞ and write N˜ (dt, dz) = N (dt, dz)−θ (dz)dt for the compensated
jump martingal rondom measure of N. Obviously, we have
Ft = σ
[∫ ∫
A×(0,s]
N (dr, de) ; s ≤ t, A ∈ B (Z)
]
∨ σ [Bs; s ≤ t] ∨ N ,
where N denotes the totality of ν−null sets, and σ1 ∨ σ2 denotes the σ−field generated by σ1 ∪ σ2.
2.1 Notations
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations:
• Sn : the set of n× n symmetric real matrices.
• C⊤ : the transpose of the vector (or matrix) C.
• 〈., .〉 : the inner product in some Euclidean space.
For any Euclidean space H = Rn, Rn×m or Sn with Frobenius norm |.| we let for any t ∈ [0, T ]
• Lp (Ω,Ft,P;H) := {ξ : Ω→ H | ξ is Ft −measurable, with E [|ξ|
p] <∞}, for any p ≥ 1.
• L2 (Z,B (Z) , θ;H) :=
{
r (.) : Z → H | r (.) is B (Z)−measurable, with
∫
Z
|r (z)|2 θ (dz) <∞
}
.
• S2F (t, T ;H) :=
{
X (.) : [t, T ]× Ω→ H | X (.) is (Fs)s∈[t,T ] − adapted,
s 7→ X(s) is ca`dla`g, with E sup
s∈[t,T ]
|X (s)|2 ds <∞
}
.
• L2F (t, T ;H) :=
{
X (.) : [t, T ]× Ω→ H |X (.) is (Fs)s∈[t,T ] − adapted, with E
[∫ T
t
|X (s)|2 ds
]
<∞
}
.
• Lθ,2F ([t, T ]× Z;H) :=
{
R (., .) : [t, T ]× Ω× Z → H | R (.) is (Fs)s∈[t,T ] − adapted measurable
process on [t, T ]× Ω× Z, with E
[∫ T
t
∫
Z
|R (s, z)|2 θ (dz) ds
]
<∞
}
.
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• C ([0, T ] ;H) := {f : [0, T ]→ H | f (.) is continuous} .
• D [0, T ] := {(t, s) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, T ] , such that s ≥ t} .
• C (D [0, T ] ;H) := {f (., .) : D [0, T ]→ H (t, s) | f (., .) is continuous} .
• C0,1 (D [0, T ] ;H) :=
{
f (., .) : D [0, T ]→ H | f (., .) and
∂f
∂s
(., .) are continuous
}
.
2.2 Problem statement
We consider a n-dimensional non homogeneous linear controlled jump diffusion system
dX (s) = {A (s)X (s) +B (s)u (s) + b (s)} ds+
d∑
j=1
{Cj (s)X (s) +Dj (t) u (s) + σj (s)} dW j (s)
+
∫
Z
{E (s, z)X (s−) + F (s, z)u (s) + c (s, z)} N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
X (t) = ξ.
(2.1)
where (t, ξ, u (.)) ∈ [0, T ] × L2 (Ω,Ft,P;Rn) × L2F (t, T ;R
m) . Note that L2F (t, T ;R
m) is the space of all
admissible strategies. Our aim is to minimize the following expected discounted cost functional
J (t, ξ, u (.))
= Et
[∫ T
t
1
2
(
〈Q (t, s)X (s) , X (s)〉+
〈
Q¯ (t, s)Et [X (s)] ,Et [X (s)]
〉
+ 〈R (t, s)u (s) , u (s)〉
)
ds
+ 〈µ1 (t) ξ + µ2 (t) , X (T )〉
+
1
2
(
〈G (t)X (T ) , X (T )〉+
〈
G¯ (t)Et [X (T )] ,Et [X (T )]
〉)]
,
(2.2)
over u (.) ∈ L2F (t, T ;R
m) ,where X (.) = Xt,ξ (.;u (.)) and Et [.] = E [. |Ft ] .
We need to impose the following assumptions about the coefficients
(H1) The functions A (.) , Cj (.) : [0, T ] → Rn×n, B (.) , Dj (.) : [0, T ] → Rn×m, b (.) , σj (.) : [0, T ] → Rn,
E (., .) : [0, T ]× Z → Rn×n, F (., .) : [0, T ]× Z → Rn×m, and c (., .) : [0, T ]× Z → Rn are continuous,
and the coefficients on the cost functional satisfy
Q (., .) , Q¯ (., .) ∈ C (D [0, T ] ;Sn) ,
R (., .) ∈ C (D [0, T ] ;Sm) ,
G (.) , G¯ (.) ∈ C ([0, T ] ;Sn) ,
µ1 (.) ∈ C ([0, T ] ;Rn×n) ,
µ2 (.) ∈ C ([0, T ] ;Rn) .
(H2) The functions R (., .) , Q (., .) and G (.) satisfy
R (t, t) ≥ 0, G (t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] , and Q (t, s) ≥ 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
Under (H1) for any (t, ξ, u (.)) ∈ [0, T ]× L2 (Ω,Ft,P;Rn) × L2F (t, T ;R
m) , the state equation (2.1) has
a unique solution X (.) ∈ S2F (t, T ;R
n) , see for example [11]. Moreover, we have the following estimate
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|X (s)|2
]
≤ K
(
1 + E
[
|ξ|2
])
,
for some positif constant K. The optimal control problem can be formulated as follows.
Problem (LQJ). For any given initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ] × L2 (Ω,Ft,P;Rn), find a control uˆ (.) ∈
L2F (t, T ;R
m) such that
J (t, ξ, uˆ (.)) = min
u(.)∈L2
F
(t,T ;Rm)
J (t, ξ, u (.))
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Remark 2.1. 1) The dependence of the weighting matrices of the current time t, the dependence of the
terminal cost on the current state ξ and the presence of quadratic terms of the expected controlled state
process in the cost functional make the Problem (LQJ) time-inconsistent.
2) One way to get around the time-inconsistency issue is to consider only precommitted controls (i.e.,
the controls are optimal only when viewed at the initial time).
2.3 An example of time-inconsistent optimal control problem
We present a simple illustration of stochastic optimal control problem which is time-inconsistent. Our aim
is to show that the classical SMP approach is not efficient in the study of this problem if it’s viewed as
time-consistent. For n = d = 1, consider the following controlled SDE starting from (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R{
dXt,x (s) = bu (s) ds+ σdW (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
Xt,x (t) = x,
(2.3)
where b and σ are real constants. The cost functional given by
J (t, x, u (.)) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
t
|u (s)|2 ds+ h (t)
(
Xt,x (T )− x
)2]
, (2.4)
where h (.) : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) , is a general deterministic non-exponential discount function satisfying h (0) = 1,
h (s) ≥ 0 and
∫ T
0
h (t) dt <∞. We want to address the following stochastic control problem.
Problem (E). For any given initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, find a control u¯ (.) ∈ L2F (t, T ;R) such that
J (t, x, u¯ (.)) = min
u(.)∈L2
F
(t,T ;R)
J (t, x, u (.)) ,
At a first stage, we consider Problem (E) as a standard time consistent stochastic linear quadratic
problem. Since J (t, x, .) is convex and coercive, there exists then a unique optimal control for this problem
for each fixed initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R. Notice that the usual Hamiltonian associated to this problem is
H : [0, T ]× R4 → R such that for every (s, y, v, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R4 we have
H (s, y, v, p, q) = pbv + σq −
1
2
v2,
Let ut,x (.) be an admissible control for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R. Then the corresponding first order and second
order adjoint equations are given respectively by{
dpt,x (s) = qt,x (s) dW (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
pt,x (T ) = −h (t) (Xt,x (T )− x) ,
and {
dP t,x (s) = Qt,x (s) dW (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
P t,x (T ) = −h (t) ,
the last equation has only the solution (P t,x (s) , Qt,x (s)) = (−h (t) , 0) , ∀s ∈ [t, T ] .
Note that, the corresponding H-function is given by
H (s, y, v) = H
(
s, y, v, pt,x (s) , qt,x (s)
)
= pt,x (s) bv + σqt,x (s)−
1
2
v2,
which is a concave function of v. Then according to the sufficient condition of optimality, see e.g. Theorem
5.2 pp 138 in [14], for any fixed initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, Problem (E) is uniquely solvable with an
optimal control u¯t,x (.) having the representation
u¯t,x (s) = bp¯t,x (s) , ∀s ∈ [t, T ] ,
such that the process (p¯t,x (.) , q¯t,x (.)) is the unique adapted solution to the BSDE{
dp¯t,x (s) = q¯t,x (s) dW (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
p¯t,x (T ) = −h (t)
(
X¯t,x (s)− x
)
.
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By stadard arguments we can show that the processes (p¯t,x (.) , q¯t,x (.)) are explicitly given by{
p¯t,x (s) = −M t (s)
(
X¯t,x (s)− x
)
, s ∈ [t, T ] ,
q¯t,x (s) = −σM t (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
where X¯t,x (.) is the solution of the state equation corresponding to u¯t,x (.) , given by{
dX¯t,x (s) = b2p¯t,x (s) ds+ σdW (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
X¯t,x (t) = x.
and
M t (s) =
h (t)
b2h (t) (T − s) + 1
, ∀s ∈ [t, T ] .
A simple computation show that
ut,x (s) = −
bh (t)
b2h (t) (T − s) + 1
(
X¯t,x (s)− x
)
, ∀s ∈ [t, T ] ,
clearly we have
ut,x (s) 6= 0, ∀s ∈ (t, T ] . (2.5)
In the next stage, we will see that Problem (E) is time-inconsistent, for this we first fix the initial data
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R. Note that, if we assume that the Problem (E) is time-consistent, in the sense that for any
r ∈ [t, T ] the restriction of u¯t,x (.) on [r, T ] is optimal for Problem (E) with initial pair
(
r, X¯t,x (r)
)
, however
as Problem (E) is uniquely solvable for any initial pair, we should have then ∀r ∈ (t, T ]
u¯t,x (s) = u¯r,X¯
t,x(r) (s) = −
bh (r)
b2h (r) (T − s) + 1
(
X¯r,X¯
t,x(r) (s)− X¯t,x (r)
)
, ∀s ∈ [r, T ] ,
where X¯r,Xˆ
t,x(r) (.) solves the SDE dX¯r,X¯
t,x(r) (s) = b2
h (r)
b2h (r) (T − s) + 1
(
X¯r,X¯
t,x(r) (s)− X¯t,x (r)
)
ds+ σdW (s) , ∀s ∈ [r, T ] ,
X¯r,X¯
t,x(r) (r) = X¯t,x (r) .
In particular by the uniqueness of solution to the state SDE we should have
u¯t,x (r) = −
bh (r)
b2h (r) (T − r) + 1
(
X¯r,X¯
t,x(r) (r)− X¯t,x (r)
)
= 0,
is the only optimal solution of the Problem (E), this contradict (2.5). Therefore, Problem (E) is not time-
consistent, and more precisely, the solution obtained by the classical SMP is wrong and the problem is rather
trivial since the only optimal solution equal to zero.
3 Characterization of equilibrium strategies
The purpose of this paper is to characterize open-loop Nash equilibriums instead of optimal controls. We
use the game theoretic approach to handle the time inconsistency in the same perspective as Ekeland and
Lazrak [6], Bjork and Murgoci [2]. Let us briefly describe the game perspective that we will consider, as
follows.
• We consider a game with one player at each point t in [0, T ]. This player represents the incarnation of
the controller at time t and is referred to as “player t”.
• The t− th player can control the system only at time t by taking his/her strategy u (t, .) : Ω→ Rm.
• A control process u (.) is then viewed as a complete description of the chosen strategies of all players
in the game.
• The reward to the player t is given by the functional J (t, ξ, u (.)). Note that J (t, ξ, u (.)) depends only
on the restriction of the control u (.) to the time interval [t, T ] .
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In the above description, we have presented the concept of a “ Nash equilibrium point” of the game.
This is an admissible control process uˆ (.) satisfying the following condition; Suppose that every player s,
such that s > t, will use the strategy uˆ (s). Then the optimal choice for player t is that, he/she also uses the
strategy uˆ (t) .
Nevertheless, the problem with this “definition”, is that the individual player t does not really influence
the outcome of the game at all. He/she only chooses the control at the single point t, and since this is a time
set of Lebesgue measure zero, the control dynamics will not be influenced. Therefore, to characterize open-
loop Nash equilibriums, which have not to be necessary feedback, we follow [9] who suggest the following
formal definition inspired by [6] and [7].
Noting that, for brevity, in the rest of the paper, we suppress the subscript (s) for the coefficients
A (s) , B (s) , b (s) , Cj (s) , Dj (s) , σj (s), and we use the notation ̺ (z) instead of ̺ (s, z) for ̺ = E,F and
c. In addition, sometimes we simply call uˆ (.) an equilibrium control instead of open-loop Nash equilibrium
control when there is no ambiguity.
We define an equilibrium by local spike variation, given an admissible control uˆ (.) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
m) . For
any t ∈ [0, T ] , v ∈ L2 (Ω,Ft,P;Rm) and for any ε > 0, define
uε (s) =
{
uˆ (s) + v, for s ∈ [t, t+ ε) ,
uˆ (s) , for s ∈ [t+ ε, T ] ,
(3.1)
we have the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Open-loop Nash equilibrium). An admissible strategy uˆ (.) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
m) is an open-loop
Nash equilibrium control for Problem (LQJ) if
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (.)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (.)
)}
≥ 0, (3.2)
for any t ∈ [0, T ] , and v ∈ L2 (Ω,Ft,P;R
m) . The corresponding equilibrium dynamics solves the following
SDE with jumps
dXˆ (s) =
{
AXˆ (s) +Buˆ (s) + b
}
ds+
d∑
j=1
{
CjXˆ (s) +Dj uˆ (s) + σj
}
dW j (s)
+
∫
Z
{
E (z) Xˆ (s−) + F (z) uˆ (s) + c (z)
}
N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [0, T ] ,
Xˆ0 = x0.
3.1 The flow of adjoint equations
First, we introduce the adjoint equations involved in the stochastic maximum principle which character-
ize the open-loop Nash equilibrium controls of Problem (LQJ). Define the Hamiltonian H : D [0, T ] ×
L
1 (Ω,Ft,P;Rn)× Rm × Rn × Rn×d × L2 (Z,B (Z) , ν;Rn)→ R by
H (t, s,X, u, p, q, r (.))
= 〈p,AX +Bu+ b〉+
d∑
j=1
〈qj , DjX + Cju+ σj〉 −
1
2
〈R (t, s)u, u〉
+
∫
Z
〈r (z) , E (z)X + F (z)u+ c (z)〉 θ (dz)−
1
2
(
〈Q (t, s)X,X〉+
〈
Q¯ (t, s)Et [X ] ,Et [X ]
〉)
.
(3.3)
Let uˆ (.) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
m) and denote by Xˆ (.) the corresponding controlled state process. For each
t ∈ [0, T ], we introduce the first order adjoint equation defined on the time interval [t, T ], and satisfied by
the triple of processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) as follows
dp (s; t) = −
A⊤p (s; t) +
d∑
j=1
C⊤j qj (s; t) +
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
r (s, z; t) θ (dz)−Q (t, s) Xˆ (s)
−Q¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]}
ds+
d∑
j=1
qj (s; t) dW
j (s) +
∫
Z
r (s−, z; t) N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
p (T ; t) = −G (t) Xˆ (T )− G¯ (t)Et
[
Xˆ (T )
]
− µ1 (t) Xˆ (t)− µ2 (t) ,
(3.4)
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where q (.; t) = (q1 (.; t) , ..., qd (.; t)) . Similarly, we introduce the second order adjoint equation defined on
the time interval [t, T ] , and satisfied by the triple of processes (P (.; t) ,Λ (.; t) ,Γ (., .; t)) as follows
dP (s; t) = −
{
A⊤P (s; t) + P (s; t)A+
d∑
j=1
(
C⊤j P (s; t)Cj + Λj (s; t)Cj
+ C⊤j Λj (s; t)
)
+
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
(Γ (s, z; t) + P (s; t))E (z) θ (dz)
+
∫
Z
Γ (s, z; t)E (z) θ (dz) +
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
Γ (s, z; t) θ (dz)−Q (t, s)
}
ds
+
d∑
j=1
Λj (s; t) dW
j
s +
∫
Z
Γ (s−, z; t) N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
P (T ; t) = −G (t) ,
(3.5)
where Λ (.; t) = (Λ1 (.; t) , ...,Λd (.; t)). Under (H1) the BSDE (3.4) is uniquely solvable in S2F (t, T ;R
n) ×
L2F
(
t, T ;Rn×d
)
× Lθ,2F ([t, T ]× Z;R
n) , see e.g. [11]. Moreover there exists a constant K > 0 such that
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|p (s; t)|2
Rn
]
+ E
[∫ T
t
|q (s; t)|2
Rn×d
ds
]
+ E
[∫ T
t
∫
Z
|r (s, z; t)|2
Rn
θ (dz)ds
]
≤ K
(
1 + |x0|
2
)
. (3.6)
In an other hand, noting that the final data of the equation (3.5) is deterministic, it is straightforward
to look at a deterministic solution. In addition we have the following representation
dP (s; t) = −
{
A⊤P (s; t) + P (s; t)A+
d∑
j=1
C⊤j P (s; t)Cj
+
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
P (s; t)E (z) θ (dz)−Q (t, s)
}
ds, s ∈ [t, T ] ,
P (T ; t) = −G (t) ,
(3.7)
which is a uniquely solvable matrix-valued ordinary differential equation. Indeed, if we define the function
Φ (s, .) for each s ∈ [0, T ] , as the fundamental solution of the following linear SDE dΦ (s, r) = A (r) Φ (s, r) dr +
d∑
j=1
Cj (r) Φ (s, r) dW
j (r) +
∫
Z
E (r, z)Φ (s, r−) N˜ (dr, dz) , r ∈ [s, T ] ,
Φ (s, s) = I.
(3.8)
Then, by standard arguments based on the Ito’s formula we can prove that the triple (P (.; t) ,Λ (.; t) ,Γ (., .; t))
solution to (3.7) is explicitly given by
P (s; t) = Es
[
−Φ (s, T )⊤G (t)Φ (s, T )−
∫ T
s
Φ (s, r)
⊤
Q (t, r) Φ (s, r) ds
]
, s ∈ [t, T ] ,
Λj (s; t) = 0, s ∈ [t, T ] , for j = 1, 2, ..., d,
Γ (s, z; t) = 0, (s, z) ∈ [t, T ]× Z.
(3.9)
Next, for each t ∈ [0, T ] , associated with the 6-tuple
(
uˆ (.) , Xˆ (.) , p (.; t) , q (., t) , r (., .; t) , P (.; t)
)
we
define the Ht-function as follows
Ht (s,X, u) = H (t, s,X, uˆ (s) + u, p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)) +
1
2
d∑
j=1
u⊤D⊤j P (s; t)Dju
+
1
2
∫
Z
u⊤F (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z)uθ (dz) , (3.10)
where (s,X, u) ∈ [t, T ]× L1 (Ω,F ,P;Rn)× Rm.
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3.2 A stochastic maximum principle for equilibrium controls
In this section, we present a version of Pontryagin’s stochastic maximum principle which characterize the
equilibrium controls of Problem (LQJ). We derive the result by using the second order Taylor expansion in
the special form spike variation (3.1). Here, we don’t assume the non-negativity condition about the matrices
Q, G and R as in [9] and [20].
The following theorem is the first main result of this work, it’s providing a necessary and sufficient
condition to characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium controls for time-inconsistent Problem (LQJ).
Theorem 3.2 (Stochastic Maximum Principle For Equilibriums). Let (H1) holds. Then an admissible
control uˆ (.) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
m) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium, if and only if, for any t ∈ [0, T ], there exist a
unique triple of adapted processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) which satisfy the BSDE (3.4) and a deterministic
matrix-valued function P (.; t) which satisfies the ODE (3.7), such that the following condition holds, for all
u ∈ Rm
H
(
t, t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (t) + u, p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
)
−H
(
t, t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (t) , p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
)
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
u⊤Dj (t)
⊤
P (t; t)Dj (t)u+
1
2
∫
Z
u⊤F (t, z)
⊤
P (t; t)F (t, z)uθ (dz) ≤ 0, P− a.s,
(3.11)
or equivalently, we have the following two conditions, the first order equilibrium condition
R (t, t) uˆ (t)−B (t)⊤ p (t; t)−
d∑
j=1
Dj (t)
⊤
qj (t; t)−
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
r (t, z; t) θ (dz) = 0, P−a.s, (3.12)
and the second order equilibrium condition
R (t, t)−
d∑
j=1
Dj (t)
⊤
P (t; t)Dj (t)−
∫
Z
F (t, z)⊤ P (t; t)F (t, z) θ (dz) ≥ 0. (3.13)
We point that the above result provides a characterisation of open-loop Nash equilibrium controls via
a stochastic maximum principle which is not in the same setting that the classical stochastic maximum
principle for optimal controls [22] in the sense that, the above result involves the existence of solutions(
Xˆ (.) , (p (.; t) , q (.; t) r (., .; t))t∈[0,T ]
)
to a ”flow” of forward-backward stochastic differential equations pa-
rameterized by t ∈ [0, T ], while the Pontryagin’s stochastic maximum principle for optimal controls involve
only one system of forward-backward stochastic differential equation. Note that for each t ∈ [0, T ], (3.4) and
(3.5) are backward stochastic differential equations. So, as we consider all t in [0, T ] , all their corresponding
adjoint equations form essentially a ”flow” of BSDEs. Moreover, there is an additional constraint (3.11)
which is equivalent to the conditions (3.12) and (3.13) that acts on the flow only when s = t.
Our goal now, is to give a proof of the Theorem 3.2. The main idea is still based on the variational
techniques in the same spirit of proving the stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle [17].
Let uˆ (.) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
m) be an admissible control and Xˆ (.) the corresponding controlled process solution
to the state equation. Consider the perturbed control uε (.) defined by the spike variation (3.1) for some
fixed arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ] , v ∈ L2 (Ω,Ft,P;R
m) and ε ∈ [0, T − t] . Denote by Xˆε (.) the solution of the state
equation corresponding to uε (.). Since the coefficients of the controlled state equation are linear, then by
the standard perturbation approach, see e.g. [17], we have
Xˆε (s)− Xˆ (s) = yε,v (s) + zε,v (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] , (3.14)
where yε,v (.) and zε,v (.) solve the following linear stochastic differential equations, respectively
dyε,v (s) = Ayε,v (s) ds+
d∑
j=1
{
Cjy
ε,v (s) +Djv1[t,t+ε) (s)
}
dW j (s)
+
∫
Z
{
E (z) yε,v (s−) + F (z) v1[t,t+ε) (s)
}
N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
yε,v (t) = 0,
(3.15)
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and 
dzε,v (s) =
{
Azε,v (s) +Bv1[t,t+ε) (s)
}
ds+
d∑
j=1
Cjz
ε,v (s) dW j (s)
+
∫
Z
E (z) zε,v (s) N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
zε,v (t) = 0.
(3.16)
Now, we present the following technical lemma needed later in this study, see the Appendix A.1. for its
proof.
Lemma 3.3. Under assumption (H1), the following estimates hold
E
t [yε (s)] = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ] and sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣Et [zε (s)]∣∣2 = O (ε2) , (3.17)
E
t
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|yε (s)|2
]
= O (ε) and Et
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|zε (s)|2
]
= O
(
ε2
)
. (3.18)
Moreover, we have the equality
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (.)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (.)
)
= −Et
 T∫
t
{
H
(
t, s, Xˆ (s) , uˆ (s) + v, p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)
)
− H
(
t, s, Xˆ (s) , uˆ (s) , p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)
)}
1[t,t+ε) (s) ds
+
1
2
T∫
t
{
d∑
j=1
v⊤D⊤j P (s; t)Djv +
∫
Z
v⊤F (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z) vθ (dz)
}
1[t,t+ε) (s) ds
]
+ o (ε) .
(3.19)
Now, we are ready to give the proof of the Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Given an open-loop Nash equilibrium uˆ (.), then for any t ∈ [0, T ] and
v ∈ L2 (Ω,Ft,P;Rm) , we have clearly
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (.)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (.)
)}
≤ 0,
from which we deduce
lim
ε→0
1
ε
E
t
[∫ T
t
{
H
(
t, s, Xˆ (s) , uˆ (s) + v, p (s; t) ; q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)
)
−H
(
t, s, Xˆ (s) , uˆ (s) , p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)
)
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
v⊤D⊤j P (s; t)Djv +
1
2
∫
Z
v⊤F (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z) vθ (dz)
}
1[t,t+ε) (s) ds
]
≤ 0,
which leads to
H
(
t, t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (t) + v, p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
)
−H
(
t, t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (t) , p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
)
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
v⊤Dj (t)
⊤
P (t; t)Dj (t) v +
1
2
∫
Z
v⊤F (t, z)⊤ P (t; t)F (t, z) vθ (dz) ≤ 0, P− a.s,
Therefore, by stetting v ≡ u for an arbitrarily u ∈ Rm we obtain (3.11) .
Conversely, given an admissible control uˆ (.) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
m) . Suppose that for any t ∈ [0, T ] , the
variational inequality (3.11) holds. Then for any v ∈ L2 (Ω,F (t) ,P;Rm) it yields
H
(
t, t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (t) + v, p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
)
−H
(
t, t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (t) , p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
)
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
v⊤Dj (t)
⊤
P (t; t)Dj (t) v +
1
2
∫
Z
v⊤F (t, z)
⊤
P (t; t)F (t, z) vθ (dz) ≤ 0, P− a.s,
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consequently
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
{
H
(
t, s, Xˆ (s) , uˆ (s) + v, p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)
)
−H
(
t, s, Xˆ (s) , uˆ (s) , p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)
)
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
v⊤D⊤j P (s; t)Djv +
1
2
∫
Z
v⊤F (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z) vθ (dz)
}
ds
]
≤ 0.
Hence
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (.)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (.)
)}
≤ 0,
thus uˆ (.) is an equilibrium control.
Easy manipulations show that the variational inequality (3.11) is equivalent to
Ht
(
t, Xˆ (t) , 0
)
= max
u∈Rm
Ht
(
t, Xˆ (t) , u
)
,
then (3.12) and (3.13) follow respectively from the following first order and second order conditions of the
maximum point uˆ = 0 for the quadratic function u→ Ht
(
t, Xˆ (t) , .
)
∂Ht
∂u
(
t, Xˆ (t) , 0
)
= 0 and
∂2Ht
∂u2
(
t, Xˆ (t) , u
)
≤ 0.
Then, the required result directly follows.
In Theorem 3.2, in view of condition (3.11), as long as the term
−
 d∑
j=1
Dj (t)
⊤
P (t; t)Dj (t)+
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
P (t; t)F (t, z) θ (dz)
 ,
for each t ∈ [0, T ] is sufficiently positive definite, the necessary and sufficient condition for equilibriums might
still be satisfied even if R (t, t) is negative. This is different from [9] and [20] where the authors have assumed
the non-negativity of the matrices Q, G and R in order to state their stochastic maximum principle for
open-loop Nash equilibriums. Moreover, in view of (3.9) in the case where Q (t, s) ≥ 0 for every s ∈ [t, T ] ,
and G (t) ≥ 0, it follows that the solution of the second order adjoint equation satisfies P (t; t) ≤ 0, then if
further we have R (t, t) ≥ 0, Thus the condition that
R (t, t)−
d∑
j=1
Dj (t)
⊤
P (t; t)Dj (t)−
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
P (t; t)F (t, z) θ (dz) ≥ 0,
is obviously satisfied. Therefore, we summarize the main theorem into the following Corollary.
Corollary 3.4. Let (H1)-(H2) hold. Then an admissible control uˆ (.) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
m) is an equilibrium
control, if and only if, for any t ∈ [0, T ], there exists a triple of adapted processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t))
which satisfies the BSDE (3.4) , with only the first order condition (3.12) holds.
4 Linear feedback stochastic equilibrium control
In this section, we consider only the case where the Brownian motion is one-dimensional (d = 1) for sim-
plicity of presentation. There is no essential difficulty with the multidimensional Brownian motions. All
the indices j will then be dropped. Our goal is to obtain a state feedback representation of an equilib-
rium control for Problem (LQJ) via some class of ordinary differential equations. Suppose that uˆ (.) is an
equilibrium control and denote by Xˆ (.) the corresponding controlled process. Then in view of Theorem
3.2, there exists a flow of triple of adapted processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t))t∈[0,T ) for which the 3-tuple(
uˆ (.) , Xˆ (.) , (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t))t∈[0,T )
)
solves the following flow of forward-backward SDE with jumps,
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parametrized by t ∈ [0, T ]
dXˆ (s) =
{
AXˆ (s) +Buˆ (s) + b
}
ds+
{
CXˆ (s) +Duˆ (s) + σ
}
dW (s)
+
∫
Z
{
E (z) Xˆ (s−) + F (z) uˆ (s) + c (z)
}
N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [0, T ] ,
dp (s; t) = −
{
A⊤p (s; t) + C⊤q (s; t) +
∫
Z
E (z)⊤ r (s, z; t) θ (dz)−Q (t, s) Xˆ (s)
−Q¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]}
ds+ q (s; t)dW (s) +
∫
Z
r (s−, z; t) N˜ (ds, dz) , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T,
Xˆ0 = x0, p (T ; t) = −G (t) Xˆ (T )− G¯ (t)Et
[
Xˆ (T )
]
− µ1 (t) Xˆ (t)− µ2 (t) , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
(4.1)
with the condition
R (t, t) uˆ (t)−B⊤p (t; t)−D (t)⊤ q (t; t)−
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
r (t, z; t) θ (dz) = 0, P− a.s, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] . (4.2)
Now, to solve the above stochastic system, we conjecture that Xˆ (.) and p (.; t) for t ∈ [0, T ) are related
by the following relation
p (s; t) = −M (t, s) Xˆ (s)− M¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]
−Υ(t, s) Xˆ (t)− ϕ (t, s) , (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] , (4.3)
for some deterministic functionsM (., .) , M¯ (., .) ,Υ(., .) ∈ C0,1 (D [0, T ] ,Rn×n) and ϕ (., .) ∈ C0,1 (D [0, T ] ,Rn)
such that
M (t, T ) = G (t) , M¯ (t, T ) = G¯ (t) , Υ(t, T ) = µ1 (t) , ϕ (t, T ) = µ2 (t) , t ∈ [0, T ] . (4.4)
Applying Ito’s formula to (4.3) and using (4.1), it yields
dp (s; t) =
{
−
∂M
∂s
(t, s) Xˆ (s)−
∂M¯
∂s
(t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]
−
∂Υ
∂s
(t, s) Xˆ (t)−
∂ϕ
∂s
(t, s)
− M (t, s)
(
AXˆ (s) +Bu (s) + b
)
− M¯ (t, s)
(
AEt
[
Xˆ (s)
]
+BEt [u (s)] + b
)}
ds
−M (t, s)
(
CXˆ (s) +Duˆ (s) + σ
)
dW (s)
−
∫
Z
M (t, s)
(
E (z) Xˆ (s−) + F (z) uˆ (s) + c (z)
)
N˜ (ds, dz) ,
= −
{
A⊤p (s; t) + C⊤q (s; t) +
∫
Z
E (z)⊤ r (s, z; t) θ (dz) −Q (t, s) Xˆ (s)
−Q¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]}
ds+ q (s; t)dW (s) +
∫
Z
r (s−, z; t) N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [t, T ] , (4.5)
and we obtain
q (s; t) = −M (t, s)
(
CXˆ (s) +Duˆ (s) + σ
)
, (4.6)
r (s, z; t) = −M (t, s)
(
E (z) Xˆ (s) + F (z) uˆ (s) + c (z)
)
. (4.7)
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By taking (4.6) and (4.7) in (4.2) we get
0 = R (t, t) uˆ (t) +B (t)
⊤
((
M (t, t) + M¯ (t, t) + Υ (t, t)
)
Xˆ (t) + ϕ (t, t)
)
+D (t)⊤M (t, t)
(
C (t) Xˆ (t) +D (t) uˆ (t) + σ (t)
)
+
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t)
(
E (t, z) Xˆ (t) + F (t, z) uˆ (t) + c (t, z)
)
θ (dz) ,
=
{
R (t, t) +D (t)
⊤
M (t, t)D (t) +
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t)F (t, z) θ (dz)
}
uˆ (t)
+
{
B (t)⊤
(
M (t, t) + M¯ (t, t) + Υ (t, t)
)
+D (t)⊤M (t, t)C (t)
+
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t)E (t, z) θ (dz)
}
Xˆ (t)
+B (t)
⊤
ϕ (t, t) +D (t)
⊤
M (t, t)σ (t) +
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t) c (t, z) θ (dz) .
Thus if we assume that Θ (t) =
(
R (t, t) +D (t)⊤M (t, t)D (t) +
∫
Z
F (t, z)⊤M (t, t)F (t, z) ν (dz)
)−1
exists, then we deduce that uˆ (.) admits the following feedback representation
uˆ (t) = −Ψ(t) Xˆ (t)− ψ (t) , (4.8)
where Ψ (t) and ψ (t) are given by
Ψ(t) = Θ (t)
(
B (t)
⊤ (
M (t, t) + M¯ (t, t) + Υ (t, t)
)
+D (t)
⊤
M (t, t)
+
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t)E (t, z) θ (dz)
)
,
ψ (t) = Θ (t)
(
B (t)
⊤
ϕ (t, t) +D (t)
⊤
M (t, t)σ (t) +
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t) c (t, z) θ (dz)
)
.
(4.9)
Therefore, for any (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] , we have
E
t [uˆ (s)] = Ψ (s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]
+ ψ (s) . (4.10)
Next, comparing the ds term in (4.5) by the one in (4.1) , then by using the expressions (4.8) and (4.10),
we obtain
0 =
{
∂M
∂s
(t, s) +M (t, s)A+A⊤M (t, s) + C⊤M (t, s)C +
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
M (t, s)E (z) θ (dz)
−
(
M (t, s)B + C⊤M (t, s)D +
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
M (t, s)F (z) θ (dz)
)
Ψ(s) +Q (t, s)
}
Xˆ (s)
+
{
∂M¯
∂s
(t, s) + M¯ (t, s)A+A⊤M¯ (t, s)− M¯ (t, s)BΨ(s) + Q¯ (t, s)
}
E
t
[
Xˆ (s)
]
+
{
∂Υ
∂s
(t, s) +A⊤Υ(t, s)
}
Xˆ (t)
+
∂ϕ
∂s
(t, s) +
(
M (t, s) + M¯ (t, s)
)
(b−Bψ (s)) +A⊤ϕ (t, s)
+ C⊤M (t, s) (σ −Dψ (s)) +
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
M (t, s) (c (z)− F (z)ψ (s)) θ (dz)
This suggests that the functions M (., .) , M¯ (., .) ,Υ(., .) and ϕ (., .) solve the following system of ordinary
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differential equations, for (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ]
0 =
∂M
∂s
(t, s) +M (t, s)A+A⊤M (t, s) + C⊤M (t, s)C +
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
M (t, s)E (z) θ (dz)
−
(
M (t, s)B + C⊤M (t, s)D +
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
M (t, s)F (z) θ (dz)
)
Ψ(s) +Q (t, s) ,
0 =
∂M¯
∂s
(t, s) + M¯ (t, s)A+A⊤M¯ (t, s)− M¯ (t, s)BΨ(s) + Q¯ (t, s) ,
0 =
∂Υ
∂s
(t, s) +A⊤Υ(t, s) ,
0 =
∂ϕ
∂s
(t, s) +
(
M (t, s) + M¯ (t, s)
)
(b−Bψ (s)) +A⊤ϕ (t, s) + C⊤M (t, s) (σ −Dψ (s))
+
∫
Z
E (z)
⊤
M (t, s) (c (z)− F (z)ψ (s)) θ (dz) ,
M (t, T ) = G (t) , M¯ (t, T ) = G¯ (t) , Υ(t, T ) = µ2 (t) , ϕ (t, T ) = µ2 (t) , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
(4.11)
where
det
[
R (t, t) +D (t)
⊤
M (t, t)D (t) +
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t)F (t, z) θ (dz)
]
6= 0, t ∈ [0, T ] ,
and Ψ (s) , ψ (s) are given by (4.9) .
4.1 Verification Theorem
The following theorem provides a verification argument.
Theorem 4.1. let (H1)-(H2) hold. Let M (., .) , M¯ (., .) ,Υ(., .) and ϕ (., .) be the solution of the system
(4.11) . Then uˆ (.) given by (4.8) is an equilibrium control.
Proof. First, we can check that Ψ (.) and ψ (.) in (3.15) are both uniformly bounded. Then the following
linear SDE
dXˆ (s) =
{
(A−BΨ(s)) Xˆ (s) + b−Bψ (s)
}
ds
+
{
(C −DΨ(s)) Xˆ (s) + σ −Dψ (s)
}
dW (s)
+
∫
Z
{
(E (z)− F (z)Ψ (s)) Xˆ (s−) + c (z)− F (z)ψ (s)
}
N˜ (ds, dz) , for s ∈ [0, T ] ,
Xˆ (0) = x0,
is uniquely solvable, and the following estimate holds
E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣Xˆ (s)∣∣∣2] ≤ K (1 + x20) .
So the control uˆ (.) defined by (4.8) is admissible. Moreover, by definition of (p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, z; t))
via (4.3), (4.6) and (4.7) , respectively, and by applying the Ito’s formula, we can easily check that, for each
t ∈ [0, T ] the processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) satisfy (3.4) .
Finally, in view of Corollary 3.4, it’s remains to check that the condition (3.11) holds. To this end,
we substitute (p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, z; t) , uˆ (t)) taken from (4.3) , (4.6) , (4.7) and (4.8) , respecively, in the
expression
K (t) = R (t, t) uˆ (t)−B (t)⊤ p (t; t)−D (t)⊤ q (t; t)−
∫
Z
F (t, z)⊤ r (t, z; t) θ (dz) ,
we get
K (t) = R (t, t) uˆ (t) +B (t)
⊤
{(
M (t, t) + M¯ (t, t) + Υ (t, t)
)
Xˆ (t) + ϕ (t, t)
}
+D (t)
⊤
M (t, t)
(
C (t) Xˆ (t)
+ D (t) uˆ (t) + σ (t)) +
∫
Z
F (t, z)
⊤
M (t, t)
(
E (t, z) Xˆ (t) + F (t, z) uˆ (t) + c (t, z)
)
θ (dz)
= Θ (t)−1
(
uˆ (t) + Ψ (t) Xˆ (t) + ψ (t)
)
,
the representation (4.8) shows that K (t) = 0. Hence, by Corollary 3.4, uˆ (.) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium
control.
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Note that, the verification theorem (Theorem 4.1 ) assumes the existence of a solution to the system
(4.11). However, since the ODEs which should be solved by M (., .) and M¯ (., .) do not have a symmetry
structure. The general solvability for this type of ODEs when (n > 1) remains an outstanding open problem.
We will see in the next section two examples in the case when n = 1, this case is important, especially in
financial applications as the mean–variance portfolio selection model. Also, we remark that a special feature
of the case when n = 1 is that the state X (.) is one-dimensional, so are the unknownM (., .) , M¯ (., .) ,Υ(., .)
and ϕ (., .) of the system (4.11). This makes it easier to solve (4.11).
5 Some applications
5.1 Mean-variance portfolio selection problem
In this subsection, we discuss the continuous-time Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio selection problem.
We apply Theorem 4.1 to obtain a state feedback representation of an equilibrium control for the Problem.
In the absence of Poisson random jumps this problem is discussed in [9].
The problem is formulated as follows: We consider a financial market, in which two securities are traded
continuously. One of them is a bond, with price S0 (s) at time s ∈ [0, T ] governed by
dS0 (s) = S0 (s) r (s) ds, S0 (0) = s0 > 0. (5.1)
There is also a stock with unit price S1 (s) at time s ∈ [0, T ] governed by
dS1 (s) = S1 (s−)
(
α (s) ds+ β (s) dW (s) +
∫
R∗
γ (s, z) N˜ (ds, dz)
)
, S1 (0) = s1 > 0. (5.2)
where r : [0, T ] → (0,∞) , α, β : [0, T ] → R and γ : [0, T ] × R∗ → R are assumed to be deterministic and
continuous, we also assume a uniform ellipticity condition as follow σ (t)2 +
∫
Z
γ (t, z)2 θ (dz) ≥ δ, a.e, for
some δ > 0. For an investor, a portfolio π (.) is a process represents the amount of money invested in the
stock. The wealth process Xx0,pi(.) (.) corresponding to initial capital x0 > 0, and portfolio π (.), satisfies
then the equation 
dX (s) = (r (s)X (s) + π (s) (α (s)− r (s))) ds+ π (s) β (s) dW (s)
+ π (s)
∫
R∗
γ (s, z) N˜ (ds, dz) , for t ∈ [0, T ] ,
X (0) = x0.
(5.3)
As time evolves, we need to consider the controlled stochastic differential equation parametrized by
(t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2 (Ω,Ft,P;R) and satisfiied by X (.)
dX (s) = (r (s)X (s) + π (s) (α (s)− r (s))) ds+ π (s) β (s) dW (s)
+ π (s)
∫
R∗
γ (s, z) N˜ (ds, dz) , for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
X (t) = ξ.
(5.4)
The objective is to maximize the conditional expectation of terminal wealth Et [X (T )] , and at the same
time to minimize the conditional variance of the terminal wealth Vart [X (T )] , over controls π (.) valued in
R. Then, the mean-variance portfolio optimization problem is denoted as: minimizing the cost J (t, ξ, .),
given by
J (t, ξ, π (.)) =
1
2
Vart [X (T )]− (µ1 (t) ξ + µ2 (t))E
t [X (T )] , (5.5)
subject to (5.4) . Here µ1, µ2 : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) , are some deterministic non constant, continuous and bounded
functions. The above model cover the one in [9], since, in our case, the weight between the conditional variance
and the conditional expectation depends on the current wealth level, as well as, the current time, while in
[9] the weight depends on the current wealth level only. Hence, in the above model, there are three different
sources of time-inconsistency. Moreover, the above model is mathematically a special case of the general LQ
problem formulated earlier in this paper, with n = d = m = 1. Then we can apply Theorem 4.1 to obtain a
Nash equilibrium control. We recall that, the definition of equilibrium controls is in the sense of open-loop,
which is different from the feedback one in [3], [4] and [22].
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The optimal control problem associated with (5.4) and (5.5) is equivalent to minimize
J (t, ξ, u (.)) =
1
2
(
E
t
[
X (T )
2
]
− Et [X (T )]2
)
− (µ1 (t) ξ + µ2 (t))E
t [X (T )]
subject to (5.4) . Denote
ρ (t) = β (t)
2
+
∫
R∗
γ (t, z)
2
θ (dz) .
Thus, the system (4.11) reduces to
∂M
∂s
(t, s) +
{
2r (s)−
(α (s)− r (s))2
M (s, s)ρ (s)
(
M (s, s) + M¯ (s, s) + Υ (s, s)
)}
M (t, s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
∂M¯
∂s
(t, s) +
{
2r (s)−
(α (s)− r (s))2
M (s, s)ρ (s)
(
M (s, s) + M¯ (s, s) + Υ (s, s)
)}
M¯ (t, s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
∂Υ
∂s
(t, s) + r (s)Υ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
∂ϕ
∂s
(t, s) + r (s)ϕ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
M (t, T ) = 1, M¯ (t, T ) = −1, Υ(t, T ) = µ1 (t) , ϕ (t, T ) = µ2 (t) , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
(5.6)
Clearly, if M (., .) and M¯ (., .) are solutions to the first and the second equations, respectively, in (5.6),
then M˜ (., .) =
(
M¯ +M
)
(., .) solves the following ODE
∂M˜
∂s
(t, s) +
{
2r (s)−
(α (s)− r (s))2
M (s, s) ρ (s)
(
M˜ (s, s) + Υ (s, s)
)}
M˜ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ [0, T ] ,
M˜ (t, T ) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ] ,
(5.7)
which is equivalent to
M˜ (t, s) = M˜ (t, T ) e
∫ T
s
(
2r(τ)−
(α(τ)−r(τ))2
M(τ,τ)ρ(τ) (M˜(τ,τ)+Υ(τ,τ))
)
dτ
,
= 0, (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
hence
M¯ (t, s) +M (t, s) = M˜ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
Moreover, we remark that all data of the ODEs which should be solved by M (., .) and M¯ (., .) are not
influenced by t, thus (5.6) reduces to
dM
ds
(s) + 2r (s)M (s)−M (s)
(α (s)− r (s))2
M (s) ρ (s)
Υ (s, s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
M¯ (s) = −M (s) , ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
∂Υ
∂s
(t, s) + r (s)Υ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
∂ϕ
∂s
(t, s) + r (s)ϕ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
M (T ) = 1, Υ(t, T ) = µ1 (t) , ϕ (t, T ) = µ2 (t) , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
(5.8)
which is explicitly solved by
M (s) = e2
∫
T
s
r(τ)dτ
{
1 +
∫ T
s
e−
∫
T
τ
r(l)dlµ1 (τ)
(α (τ) − r (τ))2
ρ (τ)
dτ
}
, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
M¯ (s) = −e2
∫
T
s
r(τ)dτ
{
1 +
∫ T
s
e−
∫
T
τ
r(l)dlµ1 (τ)
(α (τ)− r (τ))2
ρ (τ)
dτ
}
, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
Υ(t, s) = µ1 (t) e
∫ T
s
r(τ)dτ
, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
ϕ (t, s) = µ2 (t) e
∫ T
s
r(τ)dτ , ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
(5.9)
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In view of Theorem 4.1, the representation of the Nash equilibrium control (4.8) then gives
πˆ (s) = Ψ (s) Xˆ (s) + ψ (s) , ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
where, ∀s ∈ [0, T ]
Ψ (s) =
(α (s)− r (s))
M (s) ρ (s)
Υ (s, s) and ψ (s) =
(α (s)− r (s))
M (s) ρ (s)
ϕ (s, s) .
The corresponding equilibrium dynamics solves the SDEJ
dXˆ (s) =
{
(r (s)−Ψ(s) (α (s)− r (s))) Xˆ (s)− ψ (s) (α (s)− r (s))
}
ds
−
(
Ψ(s) Xˆ (s) + ψ (s)
){
β (s) dW (s) +
∫
R∗
γ (s, z) N˜ (ds, dz)
}
, for s ∈ [0, T ] ,
Xˆ (0) = x0.
Remark 5.1. In the absence of Poisson random jumps, we have the following items
1. In the case where µ1 (t) = µ1 > 0 and µ2 (t) = µ2 > 0, the solution obtained, for the mean–variance
problem, coincides with that obtained by [9].
2. In the case where µ1 (t) = µ1 > 0 and µ2 (t) = 0, the solution obtained, coincides with that obtained
by [3].
3. In the case where µ1 (t) = 0 and µ2 (t) = µ2 > 0, the solution, obtained coincides with that obtained
by [1].
5.2 General discounting LQ regulator
In this subsection, we consider an example of a general discounting time-inconsistent LQ model. The
objective is to minimize the expected cost functional, that is earned during a finite time horizon
J (t, ξ, u (.)) =
1
2
E
t
[∫ T
t
|u (s)|2 ds+ h (t) |X (T )− ξ|2
]
(5.11)
where h (.) : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) , is a general deterministic non-exponential discount function satisfying h (0) = 1,
h (s) ≥ 0 and
∫ T
0 h (t) dt < ∞. Subject to a controlled one dimontional SDE parametrized by (t, ξ) ∈
[0, T ]× L2 (Ω,Ft,P;R) dX (s) = {aX (s) + bu (s)} ds+ σdW (s) + c
∫
R∗
N˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [0, T ] ,
X (t) = ξ,
(5.12)
where a, b and c are real constant. As mentioned in [2], this is atime-inconsistent version of the classical
linear quadratic regulator, we want control the system so that the final sate X (T ) is close to ξ while at
the same time we keep the control energy (formalized by the integral term) small. Note that, here the
time-inconsistency is due to the fact that the terminal cost depends explicitly on the current state ξ as well
as the current time t. Hence there are two different sources of time-inconsistency. For this example, the
system (4.11) reduces to
∂M
∂s
(t, s) + 2aM (t, s)− b2M (t, s)
{
M (s, s) + M¯ (s, s) + Υ (s, s)
}
= 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
∂M¯
∂s
(t, s) + 2aM¯ (t, s)− b2M¯ (t, s)
{
M (s, s) + M¯ (s, s) + Υ (s, s)
}
= 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
∂Υ
∂s
(t, s) + aΥ(t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
∂ϕ
∂s
(t, s) + aϕ (t, s)− b2
{
M (t, s) + M¯ (t, s)
}
ϕ (s, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
M (t, T ) = h (t) , M¯ (t, T ) = 0, Υ(t, T ) = h (t) , ϕ (t, T ) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] ,
(5.13)
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obviously, Υ (., .) is explicitely given by
Υ (t, s) = h (t) exp {a (T − s)} , ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] . (5.14)
Moreover, we can check thatM (., .) , M¯ (., .) and ϕ (., .) solve (5.13) , if and only if, they solve the following
system of integral equations
M (t, s) =M (t, T ) e
∫ T
s {2a−b
2(M(τ,τ)+M¯(τ,τ)+Υ(τ,τ))}dτ , ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
M¯ (t, s) = M¯ (t, T ) e
∫ T
s {2a−b
2(M(τ,τ)+M¯(τ,τ)+Υ(τ,τ))}dτ , ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
ϕ (t, s) = ϕ (t, T ) ea(T−s) − b2
∫ T
s
ea(τ−s)
(
M (t, τ) + M¯ (t, τ)
)
ϕ (τ, τ) dτ, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
(5.15)
on the other hand, we have M¯ (t, T ) = ϕ (t, T ) = 0, then (5.15) reduces to
M (t, s) =M (t, T ) e
∫ T
s {2a−b
2(M(r,r)+Υ(r,r))}dr, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
M¯ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
ϕ (t, s) = −b2
∫ T
s
ea(τ−s)M (t, τ)ϕ (τ, τ) dτ, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
(5.16)
It is clear that if M (., .) is the solution of the first equation in (5, 16) , then
ϕ (s, s) = −b2
∫ T
s
ea(τ−s)M (s, τ)ϕ (τ, τ) dτ, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
thus, there exists some constant L > 0 such that |ϕ (s, s)| ≤ L
∫ T
s
|ϕ (τ, τ)| dτ , then by Gronwall Lemma, we
conclude that ϕ (s, s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] . Therefore
ϕ (t, s) = 0, ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
is the unique solution to the last equation in the system (5.16) .
Now, it’s remains to solve the first equation in the system (5.16) . We have the following Theorem.
Theorem 5.2. The first equation in (5.16) has a unique solution in C (D [0, T ] ,R+) .
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.2.
In view of Theorem 4.1, the representation (4.8) of the Nash equilibrium control, then gives
uˆ (s) = b {Υ(s, s)−M (s, s)} Xˆ (s) , ∀s ∈ [0, T ] , (5.19)
and the corresponding equilibrium dynamics solves the SDEJ dXˆ (s) =
{
a+ b2 (Υ (s, s)−M (s, s))
}
Xˆ (s) ds+ σdW (s) + c
∫
R∗
zN˜ (ds, dz) , s ∈ [0, T ] ,
X (0) = x0.
(5.20)
To conclude this section let us present the following remark.
Remark 5.3. The Problem (E) given by the subsection 2.3, is in fact shown to be a particular case of the
general discounting LQ regulator model, formulated earlier in this paragraph, in the case when a = c = 0,
and the final data ξ = x, this leads to the following representation of the Nash equilibrium control of this
problem
uˆ (s) = b (h (s)−M (s, s)) Xˆ (s) , ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
where M (t, s) solves
M (t, s) = h (t) e
∫ T
s
−b2(M(τ,τ)+h(τ))dτ , for (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] ,
and the corresponding equilibrium dynamics solves the SDE{
dXˆ (s) = b2 {h(s)−M (s, s)} Xˆ (s) ds+ σdW (s) , s ∈ [0, T ] ,
X (0) = x0.
This in fact, the correct solution of Problem (E).
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Conclusion and future work. In this paper, we have studied a class of dynamic decision
problems of a general time-inconsistent type. We have used the game theoretic approach to handle the time
inconsistency. During this study open-loop Nash equilibrium controls are constructed as an alternative of
optimal controls. This has been accomplished through stochastic maximum principle that includes a flow
of forward-backward stochastic differential equations under maximum condition. The inclusion of concrete
examples confirms the validity of our proposed study. The work can be extended in several ways. For example,
this approach can be extended to a mean field game to construct decentralized strategies and obtain an estimate
of their performance. The reserch on this topic is in progress and will appear in our forthcoming paper.
6 Appendix: Additional proofs
A.1. Proof of Lamma 3.3. Let t ∈ [0, T ] , v ∈ L2 (Ω,Ft,P;Rm) and ε ∈ [0, T − t] . Since Et [yε,v (.)] and
E
t [zε,v (.)] solve the following ODEs, respectively{
dEt [yε,v (s)] = AEt [yε,v (s)] ds, s ∈ [t, T ] ,
E
t [yε,v (t)] = 0,
and {
dEt [zε,v (s)] =
{
AEt [zε,v (s)] +BEt [v] 1[t,t+ε) (s)
}
ds, s ∈ [t, T ] ,
E
t [zε,v (t)] = 0.
Thus, it is clear that Et [yε,v (s)] = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ] . According to Gronwall’s inequality there exists a
positive constant K such that sups∈[t,T ] |E
t [zε,v (s)]|
2
≤ Kε2. Moreover, by Lemma 2.1. in [17], we obtain
(3.18).
By these estimates, we can calculate the difference
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (.)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (.)
)
= Et
[∫ T
t
{〈
Q (t, s) Xˆ (s) + Q¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]
, yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)
〉
+
1
2
〈Q (t, s) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) , yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)〉
+
1
2
〈
Q¯ (t, s)Et [yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)] ,Et [yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)]
〉
+ 〈R (t, s) uˆ (s) , v〉 1[t,t+ε) (s) +
1
2
〈R (t, s) v, v〉 1[t,t+ε) (s)
}
ds
+
1
2
〈G (t) (yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )) , yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )〉
+
〈
G (t) Xˆ (T ) + G¯ (t)Et
[
Xˆ (T )
]
+ µ1 (t) Xˆ (t) + µ2 (t) , y
ε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )
〉
+
1
2
〈
G¯ (t)Et [yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )] ,Et [yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )]
〉]
.
(6.1)
In an other hand, from (H1) and (3.17)− (3.18) the following estimate holds
E
t
[∫ T
t
1
2
〈
Q¯ (t, s)Et [yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)] ,Et [yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)]
〉
ds
+
1
2
〈
G¯ (t)Et [yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )] ,Et [yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )]
〉]
= o (ε) .
Then, from the terminal conditions in the adjoint equations, it follows that
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (.)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (.)
)
= Et
[∫ T
t
{〈
Q (t, s) Xˆ (s) + Q¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
]
, yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)
〉
+
1
2
〈Q (t, s) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) , yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)〉
+ 〈R (t, s) uˆ (s) , v〉 1[t,t+ε) (s) +
1
2
〈R (t, s) v, v〉 1[t,t+ε) (s)
}
ds
− 〈p (T ; t) , yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )〉 −
1
2
〈P (T ; t) (yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )) , yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )〉
]
+ o (ε) .
(6.2)
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Now, by applying Ito’s formula to s 7→ 〈p (s; t) , yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)〉 on [t, T ], we get
〈p (T ; t) , yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )〉
=
T∫
t
{
(Bv)
⊤
p (s; t) 1[t,t+ε) (s) + (y
ε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
(
Q (t, s) Xˆ (s) + Q¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
])
+
d∑
j=1
(Djv)
⊤
qj (s; t) 1[t,t+ε) (s) +
∫
Z
(F (z) v)⊤ r (s, z; t) 1[t,t+ε) (s) θ (dz)
}
ds
+
d∑
j=1
T∫
t
{(
Cj (y
ε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) +Djv1[t,t+ε) (s)
)⊤
p (s; t) + (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))⊤ qj (s; t)
}
dW j (s)
+
T∫
t
∫
Z
{(
E (z) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) + F (z) v1[t,t+ε) (s)
)⊤
p (s; t)
+ (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))⊤ r (s, z; t)
}
N˜ (ds, dz) .
(6.3)
By applying Ito’s formula to s 7→ 〈P (s; t) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) , yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)〉 on [t, T ] , we get
〈P (T ; t) (yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )) , yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )〉
=
T∫
t
{
2 (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
P (s; t)Bv1[t,t+ε) (s) + (y
ε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
Q (t, s) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
+
d∑
j=1
(
2 (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
C⊤j P (s; t)Djv1[t,t+ε) (s)
+ v⊤D⊤j P (s; t)Djv1[t,t+ε) (s)
)
+
∫
Z
{
2 (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))⊤E (z)⊤ P (s; t)F (z) v1[t,t+ε) (s)
+ v⊤F (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z) v1[t,t+ε) (s) θ (dz)
}
ds
+ 2
d∑
j=1
T∫
t
{
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
P (s; t)
(
Cj (y
ε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) +Djv1[t,t+ε) (s)
)}
dW j (s)
+2
T∫
t
∫
Z
{
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
P (s; t)
(
E (z) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) + F (z) v1[t,t+ε) (s)
)}
N˜ (ds, dz) ,
(6.4)
Moreover, we conclude from (H1) together with (3.17)− (3.18) that
E
t
[∫ T
t
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))⊤ P (s; t)Bv1[t,t+ε) (s) ds
]
= o (ε) ,
E
t
[∫ T
t
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))⊤ C⊤j P (s; t)Djv1[t,t+ε) (s) ds
]
= o (ε) ,
E
t
[∫ T
t
∫
Z
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
E (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z) v1[t,t+ε) (s) θ (dz)ds
]
= o (ε) .
(6.5)
By taking the conditional expectation in (6.3) and (6.4) , then by invoking (6.5) it hold that
E
t [〈p (T ; t) , yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )〉]
= Et
 T∫
t
{
vTB⊤p (s; t) 1[t,t+ε) (s) + (y
ε,v (s) + zε,v (s))⊤
(
Q (t, s) Xˆ (s) + Q¯ (t, s)Et
[
Xˆ (s)
])
+
d∑
j=1
vTD⊤j qj (s; t) 1[t,t+ε) (s) +
∫
Z
vTF (z)
⊤
r (s, z; t) 1[t,t+ε) (s) θ (dz)
}
ds
]
, (6.6)
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and
1
2
E
t [〈P (T ; t) (yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )) , yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )〉]
=
1
2
E
t
 T∫
t
{
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
⊤
Q (t, s) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) +
d∑
j=1
v⊤D⊤j P (s; t)Djv1[t,t+ε) (s)
+
∫
Z
v⊤F (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z) v1[t,t+ε) (s) θ (dz)
}
ds
]
+ o (ε) . (6.7)
By taking (6.6) and (6.7) in (6.2) , it follows that
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (.)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (.)
)
= −Et
∫ T
t
v⊤B⊤p (s; t) +
d∑
j=1
v⊤D⊤j qj (s, t) +
1
2
d∑
j=1
v⊤D⊤j P (s; t)Djv
−v⊤R (t, s) uˆ (s)−
1
2
v⊤R (t, s) v
+
∫
Z
(
r (s, z; t)
⊤
F (z) v +
1
2
v⊤F (z)
⊤
P (s; t)F (z) v
)
θ (dz)
}
1[t,t+ε) (s) ds
]
+ o (ε) ,
which is equivalent to (3.19) .
A.2. Proof of Theorem 5.2. For a constant β > 0, to be fixed later, we introduce the following norm,
for f (., .) ∈ C (D [0, T ] ,R)
‖f‖∞,β = sup
(t,s)∈D[0,T ]
∣∣∣e−β(T−s)f (t, s)∣∣∣ ,
it is easy to check that e−βT ‖f‖∞ ≤ ‖f‖∞,β ≤ ‖f‖∞ , for every f ∈ C (D [0, T ] ,R), hence the norm ‖.‖∞,β
is equivalent to ‖.‖∞ on the Banach space C (D [0, T ] ,R) .We introduce the following nonlinear operator,
L˜ [.] : C (D [0, T ] ,R+)→ C (D [0, T ] ,R+) , such that for all f (., .) ∈ C (D [0, T ] ,R+) , we have
L˜ [f (t, s)] = L˜ [f ] (t, s) = h (t) e
∫ T
s (2a−b
2Υ(r,r)−b2f(r,r))dr.
Then our problem is equivalent to a fixed point problem for the operator L˜ [.] in the closed subset
C (D [0, T ] ,R+) of the Banach space
(
C (D [0, T ] ,R) , ‖.‖∞,β
)
.
1) Existence of solution. It is clear that L˜ [.] is well defined. Now, consider f1, f2 ∈ C ([0, T ] ,R
+),
then
L˜ [f1] (t, s)− L˜ [f2] (t, s) = h (t) e
∫ T
s (2a−b
2Υ(τ,τ))dτ
(
e−b
2
∫ T
t
f1(τ,τ)dτ − e−b
2
∫ T
t
f2(τ,τ)dτ
)
, (6.8)
we put λ (t, s) = h (t) e
∫ T
s (2a−b
2Υ(τ,τ))dτ , ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] , obviousely λ (., .) is uniformely bounded. Then
there exists some constant K > 0, such that∣∣∣L˜ [f1] (t, s)− L˜ [f2] (t, s)∣∣∣ ≤ K ∣∣∣∣e−b2∫ Ts f1(τ,τ)dτ − e−b2∫ Ts f2(τ,τ)dτ ∣∣∣∣ ,
moreover, since |e−x − e−y| ≤ |x− y| , ∀x, y ∈ [0,∞), then∣∣∣L˜ [f1] (t, s)− L˜ [f2] (t, s)∣∣∣ ≤ Kb2∫ T
s
|f1 (τ, τ) − f2 (τ, τ)| dτ, (6.9)
thus
e−β(T−s)
∣∣∣L˜ [f1] (t, s)− L˜ [f2] (t, s)∣∣∣ ≤ e−β(T−s)Kb2∫ T
s
|f1 (τ, τ) − f2 (τ, τ)| dτ,
= e−β(T−s)Kb2
∫ T
s
eβ(T−τ)e−β(T−τ) |f1 (τ, τ) − f2 (τ, τ)| dτ,
≤
Kb2
(
1− e−β(T−s)
)
β
‖f1 − f2‖∞,β ,
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hence ∥∥∥L˜ [f1]− L˜ [f2]∥∥∥
∞,β
≤
Kb2
(
1− e−βT
)
β
‖f1 − f2‖∞,β .
Therefore L˜ [.] is a contraction mapping for β large enough.
2) Uniqueness of solution. Let f1, f2 ∈ C (D [0, T ] ,R+) be two solutions, then
f1 (t, s) = L˜ [f1] (t, s) and f2 (t, s) = L˜ [f2] (t, s) , ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] .
From (6.9) we have
|f1 (s, s)− f2 (s, s)| ≤ Kb
2
∫ T
s
|f1 (τ, τ) − f2 (τ, τ)| dτ, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] ,
therefore, by Gronwall Lemma, we conclude that |f1 (s, s)− f2 (s, s)| = 0, ∀s ∈ [0, T ] , hence
f1 (t, s) = L˜ [f1] (t, s)
= h (t) e
∫ T
s
(2a−b2Υ(τ,τ)−b2f1(τ,τ))dτ
= h (t) e
∫ T
s
(2a−b2Υ(τ,τ)−b2f2(τ,τ))dτ
= f2 (t, s) , ∀ (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ]
This completes the proof.
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